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A Look at Long-Term Developments
in the Distribution of Income
and education profiles of the population, the
gender composition of the labor force, and (mostly)
inertia in income inequality, explain the lion’s
share of the forecast error variance. Policy vari-
ables, such as transfer payments and tax rates,
account for only 15 percent of the variation in
prediction errors.
What has happened to
the distribution of income?
Our description of changes in the distribution
of income proceeds in two parts. In the first part,
we divide the population into five equal-sized
subgroups, or quintiles, and examine each sub-
group’s gains from income growth.2 In the second
S
trong economic growth in the United States
during the last half of the 1980s did not trans-
late into economic gains for all income groups.
Poverty rates, for example, remained higher than
those observed in the 1970s.1 To paraphrase the
most common findings, the rich got substantially
richer during the 1980s, while the poor may have
gotten poorer.
A trend toward greater income inequality
can be cause for concern. Most Americans would
not consider it desirable if, over time, all our
society’s resources became concentrated in the
hands of a small group of individuals. On the other
hand, few Americans would desire a perfectly equal
distribution of income because income equality
implies, among other things, that people who are
college educated earn exactly the same income as
people who are high school dropouts. If everyone
earned the same income, there would be little
incentive for people to work harder, become better
educated, or find better, more efficient methods
of production. Thus, the reasons underlying a
trend toward greater income inequality are at least
as important for policy analysis as the level of
income inequality.
We set out to investigate how and why the
distribution of income has changed over time.
We find that the distribution of income has been
becoming more unequal since the early 1950s,
making what occurred in the 1980s a continuation
of a longer-running trend. We also find that the
distribution of income gains over the past dozen
years is close to its historical average. Finally, we
examine how rising income inequality relates to
changes in the economy’s demographic, business-
cycle, and policy characteristics. We find that factors
outside of direct policy control, such as the age
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1 A change in how poverty rates were calculated means that
poverty rates before 1975 are not comparable to those
since 1975. Poverty rates stayed below 10 percent during
the period 1975–80. During the 1980s, poverty rates climbed
and then fell, staying above the 10-percent threshold. While
economic growth appears to have roughly coincided with
the declines in poverty rates, growth failed to lift enough
people out of poverty to reduce the poverty rates below 10
percent.
2 Another issue arises because we use tax returns as our data
source. People do not have to file tax returns if their income
levels are too low. Consequently, the sample we use is
truncated in the sense that the lowest paid people are
omitted.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 20
part, we look at developments in an aggregate
measure of income inequality known as the Theil
entropy index. The Theil index measures the
degree of income inequality across the entire
population in one number.
The distribution of income gains. Much of the
recent attention to the issue of income inequality
has focused not on the distribution of income but
on how the gains from income growth were dis-
tributed across different income strata. According
to work by Paul R. Krugman related in a memo-
randum from the Congressional Budget Office
(1992), the top-paid 20 percent of the population
received 94 percent of the gains in after-tax income
between 1977 and 1989. In contrast, a 1992 U.S.
Treasury report shows that people who were
among the richest 1 percent of American taxpayers
in 1979 received only 11.3 percent of the total
gains in income during the 1980s (Sylvia Nasar
1992). In the New York Times, Nasar quotes Isabel
V. Sawhill’s finding that people who were in the
top-paid 20 percent of the population in 1977 saw
their incomes decline 11 percent over the next
decade, while people who had climbed into the
top category by 1986 had experienced, on aver-
age, a 65-percent increase in income.
To contribute to these discussions, we calcu-
late summary statistics for the proportion of gains
from income growth received by each population
subgroup over the recent twelve-year period and
compare those results with what occurred over
the entire 1952–89 sample.3 We find that nearly
60 percent of the gains in adjusted gross income
during the period 1977–89 accrued to the top
income quintile.
Analysts can reach such strikingly dissimilar
conclusions because analyses of the distribution
of income are very sensitive to the definitions of
income, time horizon, and population with which
the analyst works. For example, there are many
possible definitions of income. One can examine
the distribution of total income before taxes and
transfers, total income after taxes but before trans-
fers (such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children), total income after taxes and transfers,
wage income, and still other variations. It is not
too surprising that one finds different results when
comparing, say, the income distribution of indi-
viduals with the income distribution of households,
or the income distribution of taxpayers with the
income distribution of all persons.
We focus on adjusted gross incomes rather
than after-tax incomes because reliable data on
both taxes and transfers are not available. We
consider misleading any estimates of the income
distribution after taxes but before transfers because
they illustrate only part of the government’s redis-
tributive activities. In our opinion, one should
either analyze the distribution of total factor incomes
before taxes and transfers, which indicates the
distribution of market-based claims on society’s
resources, or the distribution of income after both
taxes and transfers, which indicates the distribu-
tion of purchasing power. Analyses of after-tax
incomes that do not include information on trans-
fers are neither fish nor fowl and are very prob-
lematic to interpret.
Analysts can also reach different conclusions
from one another when they use different measure-
ment techniques. In Krugman’s analysis, the share
of income gains accruing to population group i is
represented as
() / , 1 Pn ii = ∆∆ µµ
where  µ i is the change in average income for
income group i,  µ is the change in average in-
come for the total population, and n is the number
of equal-sized income groups. One can interpret
equation 1 as the ratio of the weighted-average
gain of a specified group to the average gain of
the population as a whole. The equation high-
lights changes over time in the average income
of a quintile.
The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
analyzes growth in income by quintile for the
1992 Economic Report of the President. We com-
3 Annual adjusted-gross-income data for this study are ob-
tained from various issues of Statistics of Income, pub-
lished by the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
For our analysis, we divide the population into quintiles, as
follows: the IRS organizes tax returns by adjusted gross
income, ranking by groups from lowest paid to highest paid.
By dividing the total number of returns by five, we obtain the
number of returns for each quintile. Thus, between any two
periods the change in adjusted gross income earned by
each quintile necessarily equals the aggregate change in
adjusted gross income.Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 21
bine the CEA and Krugman approaches to repre-
sent the share of income gains earned by the ith
group of the population as
() ˆ /, 2 PY Y ii = ∆∆
where  Y i is the change in income received by
the ith group, and  Y  is the change in income for
society as a whole. Equation 2, therefore, is the
ratio of income gains received by the ith group to
the income gains received by the population as a
whole. Note that the Krugman and CEA-based
measures yield identical results only when the
population size is constant.
The following example illustrates how the
interaction of population and income growth can
affect the distribution of income gains as measured
by the Krugman approach and the CEA-based
approach. Suppose the economy has two workers
with annual incomes of $30,000 and $20,000,
respectively. The next year, these same workers
earn $40,000 and $30,000, respectively, and two
new workers obtain jobs and earn $20,000 each.
Total income increased by $60,000. Average
income among wage earners increased by $2,500
(from $25,000 to $27,500), while average income
for the top half of the distribution increased by
$5,000 (from $30,000 to $35,000). According to
Krugman’s original calculation, the top half of the
distribution accounted for 100 percent of the gains
from economic growth—$5,000/(2 × $2,500).
Average income for the bottom half of the distri-
bution did not change, indicating that the bottom
half accounted for zero percent of the gains from
economic growth using equation 1. Therefore,
although each of the four participants in this
hypothetical society earned more in the second
year than they did in the first, the Krugman
measure would indicate that all of the income
gains accrued to the top half of the distribution.4
Using the CEA-based technique, the inter-
pretation is somewhat different. The top half of
the distribution received $40,000 more ($70,000 –
$30,000), while the bottom half of the distribu-
tion received $20,000 more ($40,000 – $20,000).
Thus, the top half accounted for 66.6 percent of
the gains from economic growth using equation
2, while the bottom half received 33.3 percent of
the gains.
The intuition behind the difference between
Krugman’s approach and the CEA-based approach
is fairly straightforward. In Krugman’s approach,
income received by a particular subgroup of the
population must grow at a rate faster than popula-
tion growth. Otherwise, average (per capita) income
for that subgroup would not rise, and Krugman’s
measure would indicate that they failed to share in
the income gains. Thus, if the original workers in
the example above earned $35,000 and $25,000,
respectively, in the second year, and all other aspects
of the example remained unchanged, then the
average income of the top half of the distribution
would remain at $30,000 [($35,000 + $25,000)/2],
and the average income of the bottom half of the
distribution would remain at $20,000. Krugman’s
measure would indicate that neither group has
experienced any income gains.
By the CEA-based measure (equation 2), the
condition for subgroups to share in income gains
is that the sum of population growth and income
growth for that particular subgroup exceeds zero.
Given sufficient population growth, it is possible
for the CEA-based measure to indicate that each
quintile experienced income gains even when
average income was falling for all quintiles. Thus,
relative to Krugman’s measure, the CEA method
requires that a weaker condition is satisfied for
any one subgroup to have a positive share in the
distribution of income gains.
Both Krugman’s and the CEA-based meas-
ures do not use longitudinal data. Neither of the
statistics follows a particular group of people
through time to trace how much of the aggregate
gains are distributed to that group. Therefore,
when there is substantial income mobility, these
measures of the aggregate economy say little
about the incomes received by specific individuals.
However, they say much about the distribution of
possible incomes and, therefore, about individual
opportunities. (For a discussion of income mobility
in the United States, see the box titled “Trends in
Income Mobility.”)
Table 1 reports the distribution of changes in
income for several periods. Specifically, the table
4 Michael Boskin (1992) lays out this example in describing
Krugman’s distribution of income gains.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 22
From year to year, people can and do
move from one income class to another. For
periods as long as a decade, the changes in
people’s income, especially for people in the
lowest income group, are remarkable. Table
B1 shows movements in the income distribu-
tion from 1979 to 1988.1 The data indicate
substantial income mobility, particularly among
the lower income groups. Only 65 percent of
the people who were in the top-paid 20 per-
cent of the population in 1979 were still in the
top-paid 20 percent in 1988. Two-thirds of the
people in the middle income quintile changed
classification over that ten-year period, while
more than 85 percent of the people in the
lowest income quintile changed income clas-
sifications. More than 17 percent of the people
in the lowest income category in 1979 had
climbed into the highest income category by
1988. Except for people in the highest income
category (who, by definition, could not im-
prove), those who changed income quintiles
were more likely to move up than down.
One caveat to interpreting this evidence
is that the study follows individuals who filed
Trends in Income Mobility
IRS returns in each of the ten years from 1979
through 1988. Accordingly, those who earned
such low amounts that they did not have to file
returns in any of the ten years were omitted
from the sample. These people may well be
permanently poor, making the upward mobil-
ity evidence less strong. Further, mobility out
of the lowest income categories may be over-
stated because the low income groups in
1979 undoubtedly include students and part-
time workers who became better compen-
sated as they accumulated education and
experience.
1 See Joel Slemrod (1992) for evidence on the upward bias
imparted to income inequality when looking at year-to-year
income changes. Slemrod calculates the average income
for each taxpayer over the seven-year period from 1979 to
1985. Slemrod refers to this approach as a time exposure.
Compared with the snapshots of the income inequality over
the same time period, the time-exposure Gini coefficient is
roughly 7 percent lower, suggesting that income inequality
declines somewhat as the time horizon lengthens. The
findings are consistent with changes in income from period
to period that are smoothed over when one uses income
measured over several years, instead of capturing jumps in
income that occur in any given year.
Table B1
Changes in Income Quintiles, 1979 and 1988
Status in 1988
Next Next
Top-paid highest paid Middle lowest paid Lowest paid
Status in 1979 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Top 20% 64.7 20.3 9.4 4.4 1.1
Next highest paid 20% 35.4 37.5 14.8 9.3 3.1
Middle 20% 15.0 32.3 33.0 14.0 5.7
Next lowest paid 20% 11.1 19.5 29.6 29.0 10.9
Lowest paid 20% 17.7 25.3 25.0 20.7 14.2Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 23
reports the changes in adjusted gross income
received by each quintile for the periods 1977–89,
1980–85, and 1985–89.5 The top half reports the
distribution of gains in nominal, pre-tax, and trans-
fer income using the CEA-based method (equa-
tion 2). The bottom half of the table reports the
distribution of income gains from the same data
using the Krugman method (equation 1).
Somewhat surprisingly, the results using the
Krugman method are quite similar to those using
the CEA-based method. The Krugman method
indicates that a slightly higher percentage of
income gains is going to the top quintile than indi-
cated by the CEA-based method, but this differ-
ence does not change the implication that the top
quintile reaped the majority of the income gains.
Table 1 shows that over the period 1977–89, about
60 percent of the gains in factor income (income
before taxes and transfers) went to the top-paid
quintile.
Another question is how income gains are
distributed across different subperiods. For example,
were the 1980–85 or 1985–89 periods substantially
different in terms of how income gains were dis-
tributed? The evidence presented in Table 1 suggests
that the 1985–89 period saw gains going more to
the highest paid quintiles and less to the lower-
paid quintiles. For example, during the 1980–85
period the two lowest paid quintiles accounted for
slightly more than 13 percent of the income gains,
while during the 1985–89 period the same two
quintiles accounted for less than 4 percent of the
income gains. The share of income growth re-
ceived by the middle-paid quintile was virtually un-
changed from the 1980–85 period to the 1985–89
period, while the share of income growth received
by the second highest paid quintile declined more
than 25 percent. The declines in the first, second,
and fourth quintiles were matched by the increases
of the highest paid quintile. Using the CEA-based
method, the top-paid quintile accounted for about
Table 1
Percentage of Income Gains Distributed Among
the Five Population Quintiles
Using the CEA-based method:
Period Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
1977–89 2.7 6.4 12.1 21.8 57.1
1980–85 3.3 9.8 11.0 23.6 52.4
1985–89 1.0 2.3 11.4 17.3 68.0
Using Krugman’s method:
Period Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
1977–89 2.8 5.8 11.1 20.8 59.5
1980–85 3.3 10.0 10.5 23.3 53.0
1985–89 1.8 0.0 10.7 14.7 74.5
5 These statistics also represent the distribution of real in-
come gains, assuming that each quintile has the same
deflator.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 24
52 percent of the income gains in the first half of
the 1980s, rising to about 68 percent of the gains
in the second half.
By reporting the historical averages received
by each quintile, one can see how these recent
time periods compare with the entire sample. Using
the CEA-based method, we calculate the share of
income gains received by each quintile annually
for the period 1952–89. As the evidence in Table 2
illustrates, on average the two lowest paid quintiles
received about 4.5 percent of the real income
gains over the 1952–89 sample. The highest paid
quintile averaged about 58 percent of the income
gains, while the middle-paid and second highest
paid quintiles averaged almost 11 percent and 27
percent of the gains, respectively. The evidence,
therefore, suggests that what happened during the
1977–89 period is not that different from what
happened during the postwar period.
Note that the standard deviations are substan-
tially different across the five quintiles. As Table 2
shows, the standard deviation is 5.2 percentage
points for the lowest paid quintile. There is much
greater variability in the highest paid (44.7), the
second highest paid (25.0), and the second lowest
paid (31.8) quintiles. Thus, the standard deviation
for the lowest paid quintile is only about one-third
the size of the standard deviation for the other
quintiles. This evidence suggests that the lowest
paid quintile receives a fairly steady proportion of
the income gains across time, especially when
compared with the proportions received by the
other four quintiles.
In short, the IRS data suggest that the top-
paid quintile did account for most of the gains in
factor income during the period 1977–89. How-
ever, a substantially smaller proportion went to the
top-paid quintile than was reported in Krugman’s
study of after-tax (but before transfer) incomes.
The proportion of income gains accruing to the
top-paid group increased during the latter half of
the 1980s. However, the tendency toward increas-
ing income inequality began in the 1950s, and the
1977–89 period appears to be well within the
variability observed historically.
The Theil index. At a more aggregate level, one
can measure income inequality with the Theil
entropy index:
( ) ( , ) ( / ) ( / ) ln( / ), 31
1




= ∑ µµ  
where n is the number of equal-sized population
groups, y denotes income for population group j,
and   is average income (that is,  µµ =





The Theil index is defined so that it takes on values
greater than or equal to zero and increases as in-
come inequality increases. To illustrate this point,
consider the limiting case in which income is evenly
divided among all people in the economy. With
yj /µ = 1 for j = 1, 2, ..., n, then ln(yj /µ) = 0 in
equation 3 and the Theil index equals zero. Another
attractive feature of the Theil index is that a transfer
of income from a high income person to a low
income person will cause the Theil index to fall.
Figure 1 plots estimates of the Theil entropy
measure over the period 1952–89. The plot indi-
cates an upward trend in the Theil index since 1952.
6 See Anthony Shorrocks (1980), John Bishop, John Formby,
and Paul Thistle (1989), and Daniel J. Slottje (1989) for the
set of properties that an income inequality measure pos-
sesses. This version of the Theil index differs from the
population-weighted version used by Keith R. Phillips (1992).
Table 2
Summary Statistics of the
Proportion of Real Income Gains
for each Quintile, 1952–89
(CEA-based method)





5 58.0 44.7Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 25
Regressing the Theil index against time, one finds
more concrete support for the notion that the
Theil index has been increasing. The regression
coefficient on time suggests that the Theil index
has, on average, increased 0.4 percentage points
each year. Figure 1 also shows a decline in
volatility in the Theil index. Beginning around
1980, the Theil index appears to follow a less
variable path compared with the swings observed
in the pre-1980 sample. Thus, the two apparent
inferences drawn from plotting the Theil index are
that income inequality has been increasing over
the past forty years and that volatility in the
income inequality measure has decreased some-
what during the past ten years.7
Our conclusions about the time path of in-
come inequality differ somewhat from other work
in the field. For example, Barry Bluestone and
Bennett Harrison (1988) find that the percentage
of workers falling into the low-wage stratum
follows a U-turn: the statistic falls in the 1950s and
1960s, reaches its trough in 1970, fluctuates in a
narrow band around the trough value, and then
increases beginning in 1979. The results in Figure
1 suggest that the trend toward greater income
inequality may have started even earlier than Blue-
stone and Harrison identify. As such, our findings
support those of Peter Henle and Paul Ryscavage
(1980), who find that inequality in wages has
been increasing since the late 1950s. A note of
caution in comparing the results: we are using
adjusted gross income from the IRS, while Blue-
stone and Harrison and Henle and Ryscavage are
using wage data from the Current Population
Survey. Hence, the results are not directly compa-
rable; our analysis does not overturn Bluestone
and Harrison’s.
There is evidence on income inequality for
broader measures of income. Using the Current
Population Survey, Daniel J. Slottje (1989) calcu-
lates the Theil index over the period 1947–84. The
income measure used here is before taxes but
after transfers. According to Slottje, the Theil
index falls to its lowest value in the late 1960s,
rising thereafter for the remainder of the sample
period. The implication is that a U-turn is present
in comprehensive income measure employed in
the Current Population Survey data. Again, the
income concepts used in Slottje are not the same
as ours because they include transfers and the
data sets are different. Our finding, however,
raises a question about when (and if) the U-turn
occurred in a broader income measure, when one
looks at income before taxes and transfers. It also
suggests that the U-turn in the inequality of after-
transfer income may reflect changes in the distribu-
tion of transfer policy rather than factor incomes.
What determines the distribution of income?
In this section, we turn from describing what
happened to income inequality to examining why
the distribution of income changed. The factors
affecting income inequality that we consider fall into
three categories: demographics, economic condi-
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Figure 1
Theil Index for Adjusted Gross Income, 1952–89
Percent
SOURCE OF PRIMARY DATA:
U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income.
7 The Theil index invariably measures changes in the income
distribution differently from other inequality measures be-
cause it weights transfers differently. To check the robust-
ness of our inferences, we also calculated another aggre-
gate measure of income inequality—the Gini coefficient.
The results are not materially different whether one uses the
Gini coefficient or the Theil entropy measure.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 26
the age and educational composition of the poten-
tial labor force, and the female share of the labor
force.8 Following Alan S. Blinder and Howard Y.
Esaki (1978), we include some measure of business-
cycle conditions and the inflation rate as variables
that might explain variation in income inequality.
Finally, we use the maximum marginal personal
income tax rate and real per capita transfer pay-
ments to individuals (defined as the sum of
federal, state, and local transfers) as the policy
variables. The Theil index is our measure of
income inequality.
To determine whether these characteristics
can be used to predict changes in the Theil index
over time, we estimate a VAR system of eight
equations—one for each of our eight variables—
using ordinary least squares regression. Each equa-
tion estimates contemporaneous values of the
variable as a function of two lagged values of itself
and two lagged values each of the other seven
variables. All the variables except the growth rates
for prices and gross domestic product are expressed
as first differences (the change in value between
period t and period t–1), and the variables that
are bounded by zero and one (such as the per-
centage of women in the labor force) are logisti-
cally transformed.9
Table 3 reports the results of exclusion restric-
tions for each variable in the equation in which
the Theil index is the dependent variable. The
tested hypothesis is that the coefficients on lagged
values of the variable also are jointly equal to
zero. The interpretation of the test results, then, is
whether changes in the variable help to predict
changes in the Theil index. The F statistics are
small in each case, which is consistent with the
notion that none of these variables, except past
values of the Theil index itself, helps to predict
changes in the Theil index. However, all of the
variables together explain almost 50 percent of
the variation in the Theil index. Correlations
among some of the variables may be introducing
multi-collinearity.10
Although a variable may have insignificant
explanatory power in the VAR regressions, its com-
pound influence over time may still be consider-
able. Table 4 reports how much of the two-, five-,
and ten-step-ahead forecast error variances result
from innovations in the variables.11 The evidence
strongly suggests that innovations in the Theil index
account for most of the forecast error variance.
Indeed, 54 percent of the ten-step-ahead forecast
error variance results from innovations in the Theil.
The analysis suggests that the Theil index displays
Table 3
Tests of Exclusions
Restrictions in Theil Index Equation









8 The age composition of the labor force is defined as the ratio
of people between 16 and 25 to those between 16 and 65.
The education composition of the potential labor force is
measured by the percentage of the population over age 25
that has graduated from college.
9 David Hendry and Jean–Francois Richard (1982) argue
that a logistic transformation should be applied to any
dependent variable defined over the [0,1] interval. For-
mally, the transformation redefines the variable as follows:
ln(xt/1–xt).
10 The issue with multicollinearity is that close correlation
between the explanatory variables will result in inflated
standard errors. The upshot of this is that test statistics are
downwardly biased when multicollinearity is present.
11 We apply a Choleski decomposition with the following
ordering for the recursive system: AGE, TAX, ED. ATTAIN-
MENT, THEIL, FEM SHARE, GDP, INFL, and finally TRANS.
See Christopher Sims (1980) for a more complete discus-
sion of the Choleski decomposition applied to VARs.Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 27
sents the structure, we find that transfer payments
have much less explanatory power. In our analysis,
transfer payments explain less than 6 percent of
the ten-step-ahead forecast error. In addition, the
impulse response functions suggest that increases
in transfer payments are associated with increases
in factor income inequality.
Summary and conclusions
In this article, we examine developments in
the income distribution over almost four decades
and the relative contributions of demographic,
policy, and economic conditions toward explaining
these movements. Our analysis indicates that recent
developments in income inequality and the dis-
tribution of gains from income growth are not much
different from historical norms. We find that the
top-earning 20 percent of the population reaped a
disproportionate share of the income gains during
the 1980s. However, we find that the top income
lots of persistence, accounting for movements in
the Theil over time.12
The other factors explain the rest of the ten-
step-ahead forecast error variance. Together, the
age composition and educational attainment of
the population, and the female share of the labor
force, account for slightly more than 25 percent.
Fiscal policy variables account for about 15
percent of the forecast error variance, while
inflation and output growth account for 2.2 and
4.3 percent, respectively. The evidence, there-
fore, suggests that 85 percent of the variation in
income inequality arises from factors outside
direct policy control.
Sheldon Danziger, Robert Haveman, and
Peter Gottschalk (1981) also examine the role that
the U.S. transfer payment system has on income
inequality. They use both welfare payments and
Social Security as their definition of the transfer
payment system. Comparing the distribution of
total factor income with the distribution of total
factor income plus transfer payments (but before
taxes), Danziger, Haveman, and Gottschalk con-
clude that income inequality (as measured by the
Gini coefficient) is 19 percent lower after transfers
than it is before them. The Danziger, Haveman,
and Gottschalk comparison excludes the complex
general equilibrium effects that transfer payments
have.
Using a narrower definition of transfer pay-
ments and assuming that a recursive model repre-
Table 4
Proportion of Forecast Errors for the Theil Index*
Innovation to
FEM ED.
Step-Ahead AGE SHARE ATTAINMENT Theil TAX GDP INFL TRANS
Two 5.6 1.1 5.7 72.0 10.3 0.7 1.6 3.0
Five 5.1 3.0 16.3 54.9 8.9 4.3 2.0 5.6
Ten 5.5 3.4 16.3 53.6 8.9 4.3 2.2 5.8
*Proportions may not sum to 100 due to rounding error.
12 Steven N. Durlauf (1991) examines the evolution of income
inequality and finds that persistent income inequality can
develop even with identical starting conditions. Education
and neighborhood effects reinforce one another to stratify
the economy, imparting substantial persistence in income
inequality.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 28
group has been receiving similarly large shares of
the income gains for the past forty years. Further,
using the Theil index to measure income inequal-
ity, we find that income inequality increased over
the period 1952–89.
In addition, we look at the relationship
between various factors associated with changes
in the distribution of income. In particular, we
ask which factors explain movements in income
inequality over time. We investigate demographic
factors, economic conditions, and policy variables.
The evidence reported in this article suggests that
there is a great deal of persistence in income in-
equality. Most of the forecast error variance in the
income inequality measure is explained by inno-
vations in the inequality measure itself. Fiscal policy
actions—measured as the maximum marginal tax
rate and per capita transfers—account for only about
15 percent of the variation in the forecast errors.
Overall, the evidence presented in this article
focuses on developments in income inequality
over time. In doing so, the contribution is largely
in describing how income inequality has evolved,
excluding some factors that are widely believed to
affect income inequality. The aim of future research
is to formulate theories about what determines




GDP Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FAME
dataset
CPI Bureau of Labor Statistics
AGE U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census; population
between 15 and 25 divided by the population over 16, less those
over 65 (Citibase data)
FEM SHARE U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census; total number
of employed women divided by the total labor force (Citibase
data)
TRANS National income and product accounts, transfer payments to
individuals paid by federal, state, and local governments (Citibase
data). This variable is deflated with the fixed-weight GDP deflator.
TAX Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, various issues.
ED. ATTAINMENT Current Population Survey, series P-60; percent of population
over 25 with four or more years of college.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 30
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